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Po l i c y  Re s e a R c h Wo R k i n g  Pa P e R 4430
This paper presents a small-scale intertemporal model of 
endogenous growth that accounts for the composition 
of public expenditure and externalities associated with 
public capital. Government spending is disaggregated 
into various components, including maintenance, 
security, and investment in education, health, and core 
infrastructure. After studying its long-run properties, 
the model is calibrated for Haiti, using country-specific 
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between public expenditure, growth, and poverty. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://
econ.worldbank.org. The author may be contacted at epintomoreira@worldbank.org. 
information as well as parameter estimates from the 
literature. A variety of policy experiments are then 
reported, including a reallocation of spending aimed 
at creating fiscal space to promote public investment; 
an improvement in fiscal management that leads to a 
reduction in tax collection costs; higher spending on 
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  2I.  Introduction 
 
The link between the composition of public expenditure and growth in 
developing countries has been the subject of renewed attention in recent years. A 
number of studies have documented, in particular, that episodes of fiscal 
adjustment have often been associated with large cuts in public investment; such 
cuts have translated into adverse effects on growth and poverty reduction. The 
ongoing debate on “fiscal space” has also led to renewed thinking on this issue. 
Various observers have pointed out that, in this context, creating fiscal space for 
public investment in infrastructure, health, or education, for instance, involves 
dynamic trade-offs; to evaluate these trade-offs requires a dynamic framework 
that accounts explicitly for the various channels through which the composition of 
government expenditure and public capital affects the economy. 
1 
 
This paper contributes to the existing literature by proposing a dynamic, 
small-scale endogenous growth model to evaluate the effect of the composition of 
public expenditure on growth in low-income developing countries. A key feature of 
the model is that government spending is disaggregated into various components, 
including maintenance, security, and investment in education, health, and core 
infrastructure. In addition, it also accounts for the externalities associated with 
infrastructure, in terms of its impact on education and health (see Agénor and 
Moreno-Dodson (2007)). Deininger and Okidi (2003), for instance, in a study of 
Uganda, found that the benefit of education and health care for growth depends on 
complementary investments in electricity and other infrastructure.
2 
  
In addition, the model accounts for improved political stability and 
reduction in violence. Political instability affects private sector confidence. As 
documented by Poirson (1998), for instance, using data on economic security 
                                                 
1Swaroop (1999) emphasized the need to strengthen the macro dimension in the analysis of 
World Bank public expenditure reviews (PERs). 
2There is also some evidence suggesting that education may condition the benefits (or 
efficiency) of infrastructure. As noted by van de Walle (1995), for instance, investment in education 
may enhance the marginal impact of irrigation projects. 
  3ratings for 53 developing countries for the period 1984-95, economic security has a 
positive and significant effect on private investment and growth.
3 Improvements in 
economic security contribute to the rise of private investment by decreasing 
downside uncertainty on the return to investment and securing property rights. In 
addition, improved security may enhance the efficiency of resource allocation and 
thus growth. In the model, spending on security lowers violence and increases 
private sector confidence in the economy’s prospects; this tends to reduce the rate 
of time preference and to increase private saving—which in turn stimulates private 
investment and growth. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II presents the model. 
Section III characterizes the equilibrium and the balanced growth path. Section IV 
describes the calibration procedure and the solution method. The model is 
calibrated for Haiti, using country-specific information as well as parameter 
estimates from the literature. Section V presents several experiments: an increase 
in public investment, a “fiscal space” exercise involving a reallocation of spending, 
a strengthening of fiscal management tak i n g  t h e  f o r m  o f  a reduction in tax 
collection costs, and an increase in security spending. A composite fiscal package 









                                                 
3The ratings used by Poirson relate to twelve features affecting private investment decisions : 
government leadership, external conflict risk, corruption, rule of law, racial and ethnic tensions, 
political terrorism, civil war threats, quality of the bureaucracy, risk of repudiation of contracts, 
risk expropriation by the government, political rights, and civil liberties. She found that private 
investment is mostly influenced by the risk of expropriation, the degree of civil liberty, and the 
quality of the bureaucracy. By contrast, reductions in expropriation risks and political terrorism are 
the most important security factors that bear on economic growth. Corruption and contract 
repudiation also affect growth, but only in the long run. 
  4II.  Structure of the Model 
 
We consider a small open economy in which four categories of goods are 
produced: a commodity (produced by the private sector), and three types of 
services—education and health (both of which produced by the government and the 
private sector) and infrastructure (produced solely by the government). The 
privately-produced commodity is a tradable good whose price is taken as given; it 
can be used for either consumption or investment. Production is consumed only 
domestically and represents the sole source of supply on the domestic market.
4 
The provision of education and health services by the public sector are free of 
charge, whereas public infrastructure services are sold at a nominal price that is 
fully indexed on the price of the private good.
5 Excess demand for all services 
prevails; quantities consumed are thus supply-determined. There is a single, 
infinitely lived household-producer, which includes all workers (educated and non-
educated, employed in either the public or private sector) in the economy.  
                                                
 
1.  Production of Health Services and Effective Labor 
 
Production of public health services requires combining inputs at several 
levels. At the first level, public capital in infrastructure, KGI(t), and public capital 
in health, KGH(t), must be combined to obtain the “effective” capital stock in the 
production of health services. Assuming also a Cobb-Douglas technology yields 
 
     KGIH(t) = AHC·[θI(t)·KGI(t)]
βHC·[θH(t)·KGH(t)]
1-βHC,                        (1) 
 
where AHC > 0, βHC  ∈ (0,1), and θI and θH are quality indicators of public 
infrastructure capital and health capital, respectively.  
 
4We therefore abstract from trade flows and balance-of-payments considerations.  Because, as 
discussed below, borrowing is fixed as a proportion of output, and aid (in the form of grants) adjusts 
residually to balance the budget, issues of external debt sustainability do not arise. Extending the 
analysis to account fully for the external sector (along the lines for instance of the SPAHD models 
developed by Agénor, Bayraktar, and El Aynaoui (2007), and Pinto Moreira and Bayraktar (2007)), 
would be a valuable extension of the analysis. 
5The price of the private good is therefore used as the numéraire. 
  5 
  At the second level, the effective capital stock is combined with medical 
personnel, which represents a fraction χGH of the public labor force, LEG, to 




1-βH,                             (2) 
 
where AH > 0 and βH ∈ (0,1). 
 
  The private sector also produces health services. With an eye to practical 
application of our framework, and because data on the production of health 
services by the private sector are generally unavailable, we assume that the value 
of that production is equal to the household’s spending on health services, which is 
given as a constant fraction χPH of total private spending, CP(t).
6  
 
Assuming that private and public services are perfectly substitutable, the 
total supply of health services, H(t), measured in terms of the price of the private 
commodity, is given by 
 
H(t) = YGH(t) + χPH·CP(t).                                          (3) 
 
The price of private health services is assumed to be fully indexed on the 
price of the private commodity; the relative price of private health services in 
equation (3) is thus unity. 
   
  Effective (educated) labor employed in private production, T(t), is produced 
by combining the supply of health services to the prevailing stock of educated labor 
in that sector, LEP(t): 
 
                                                 
6We therefore do not account explicitly for the fact that private production of health services 
requires private capital. We do account, however, for the use of educated labor, as shown in (18).  
 
  6T(t) = AT·[LEP(t)]
βT·[H(t)]
1-βT,                                         (4) 
 
where AT > 0 and βT ∈ (0,1). The view taken here, therefore, is that health is labor 
augmenting. Because human capital is embodied in workers, people can provide 
“effective” human capital services only if they are healthy. 
 
2.  Production of Commodities 
 
Private production, Y(t), is also specified as a multi-level (Cobb-Douglas) 
process. At the first level, production requires combining effective educated labor, 




1-βJ,                                        (5) 
 
where AJ > 0 and βJ ∈ (0,1). 
 
At the second level, the composite input J(t) is combined with uneducated 




1-βV,                                       (6) 
 
where AV > 0 and βV ∈ (0,1). 
 
At the final level, the supply of commodities, Y(t), is obtained by combining 






1-βY1-βY2,                         (7) 
 
  7where AY > 0 and βY1, βY2 ∈ (0,1). Land in the economy is in fixed supply; it 
cannot be produced and does not depreciate. For simplicity, the total quantity of 
land available is normalized to unity. 
 
3.  Population, Schooling Technology, and Labor Supply 
 
Total population, N(t), grows at the rate gN(t): 
 
N(t) = [1 + gN(t)]·N(t-1),                                             (8) 
 
where gN(t), the difference between the fertility rate and the mortality rate, is 
assumed to be inversely related to the lagged level of consumption per capita: 
 
gN(t) = gN
0 + βN[CP(t-1)/N(t-1)] - βNN[CP(t-1)/N(t-1)]
2,                         (9) 
 
where gN
0 > 0 is the autonomous rate of growth of the population, and βN, βNN > 0. 
This equation captures implicitly the impact of higher standards of living on 
fertility, and the induced demographic transition. At first, as consumption per head 
increases, the growth rate of the populat i o n  r i s e s  a s  w e l l .  H o w e v e r ,  b e y o n d  a  
certain point (given by βN/2βNN), further increases in consumption per capita lead 
to declines in the population growth rate. There is therefore an inverted U-shape 
relationship between consumption per capita and population growth.
7 
 
  The active population, LA(t), is a fraction of the total population: 
 
LA(t) = (1 - aD - aS)·N(t),                                        (10) 
 
where aD  ∈ (0,1) measures the share of dependents (defined as the number of 
children under the age of mandatory schooling and adults over the age of 65), both 
                                                 
7This specification is in line with the assumption underlying the long-run model of growth and 
development proposed by Hansen and Prescott (2002), in which the population growth rate is 
  8as a share of the total population), and aS ∈ (0,1) denotes the share of students.  
Both coefficients are taken to be constant.
8 
 
  The supply of raw labor, LR(t), is the difference between the active 
population and the total supply of educated labor: 
 
LR(t) = LA(t) – LE(t).                                           (11) 
 
The transformation of raw labor into educated labor requires an accumulation 
of skills that takes place in part through a publicly-funded education system, which 
is free of charge. In line with the micro evidence reviewed by Agénor and Moreno-
Dodson (2007), and as before, we specify a multi-level nested Cobb-Douglas 
structure to highlight the role of infrastructure and health on education.  
 
At the first level, the stock of public capital in infrastructure, KGI(t), and the 
stock of public capital in education, KGE(t), produce a composite input, which is 
referred to as “effective” education capital, KGIE(t): 
 
     KGIE(t) = AEC·[θI·KGI(t)]
βEC·[θE(t)·KGE(t)]
1-βEC,                       (12) 
 
where AEC > 0, βEC ∈ (0,1), and θE is an indicator of the quality of the stock of 
public capital in education. 
 
At the second level, effective education capital, KGIE(t), and the number of 
teachers on government payroll (which represent a fraction χGE ∈ (0,1) of total 
public employment), are combined to produce a composite public education input, 
denoted Z(t): 
 
                                                                                                                                                          
increasing (decreasing) in per capita consumption when living standards are low (high). This leads to 
a hump-shaped relationship between population growth and living standards. 
8The analysis could be extended to account for the fact that the proportion of the population 
wishing to acquire an education is positively related to the ratio of wages for educated labor and 
raw labor. 
  9Z(t) = AZ·[χGE·LEG(t)]
βZ·[KGIE(t)]
1-βZ,                                  (13) 
 
where AZ > 0 and βZ ∈ (0,1). 
 
At the third level, the total number of students, STU(t) = aS·N(t),  is 
combined with the supply of health services to determine a composite input, which 




1-βS,                                     (14) 
 
where AS > 0 and βS ∈ (0,1). Thus, as documented in several studies (reviewed for 
instance in Agénor and Moreno-Dodson (2007)) health improves the capacity of 
“raw” students to learn. 
 
At the fourth level, the “production” of newly-educated workers by the 
public sector, NE
G(t), depends on the fraction χSH
G ∈ (0,1) of the effective supply 







1-βE,                              (15) 
 
where AE > 0 and βE ∈ (0,1). 
 
As before, because data on the production of education services by the 
private sector are not always readily available, we assume that the value of that 
production (measured in terms of the number of educated individuals “produced” 
by private schools) is proportional to household spending on education services, 
which is given as a constant fraction χPE of total private spending.
9 Assuming that 
                                                 
9Again, we do not account explicitly for the fact that private production of education services 
requires private capital, but we do account for the use of educated labor (see equation (18)).  
  10private and public services are perfectly substitutable yields the total number of 
educated workers produced in the economy, NE, as 
 
NE(t) = NE
G(t) + ηNE·χPE·CP(t),                                       (16) 
 
where  ηNE = NE
P(0)/χPE·CP(0) > 0 is a ratio (fixed at its base-period value) that 
measures the “conversion rate” between real household spending on education 
services and the production of newly-educated workers by the private sector. In 
equation (16), the price of private education services is also assumed to be fully 
indexed on the price of the private commodity. 
  
Given this flow equation, the total stock of educated labor in the economy, 
LE(t), is, at any given moment in time, 
 
LE(t+1) = NE(t) + (1 - δE)·LE(t),                                     (17) 
 
where δE ∈ (0,1) is the rate of attrition of the stock of educated labor, assumed 
constant. Assuming that public sector employment (which consists only of educated 
workers) is fixed as a proportion aGE of total supply, the supply of educated labor 
involved in private production of commodities is determined residually as 
 
LEP(t) = (1 - aPE - aPH – aGE)LE(t),                                   (18) 
 
where aPE (aPH) is the share of the educated labor force involved in the private 
production of education (health) services. 
  
Wages in the private sector are assumed to be fully flexible; there is 
therefore no open unemployment of either category of labor.
10 
                                                 
10Wage rigidity could easily be introduced to generate open unemployment. Our assumption, 
however, is consistent with the evidence showing that disguised unemployment (or under-
employment in the informal sector) is more common than open unemployment in many low-income 
countries; see Agénor (2006) for a discussion. 
  114.  Consumption and Investment Decisions 
 
The household-producer maximizes the present discounted value of utility, 
given by 
 
                                                  ∞ 
maxU = Σt=1u[CP(t),H(t)]/[1+ρ(t)]
t-1,                               (19) 
 
where CP(t) is aggregate private consumption at t, ρ(t) > 0 the time preference 
rate, u[CP(t),H(t)] the instantaneous utility function. For tractability, we assume 
that instantaneous utility is separable in consumption of commodities and 
consumption of health services : 
 
u[CP(t),H(t)] = log[H(t)] + [CP(t)]
1-1/σ/(1 - 1/σ),                     (20) 
 
where σ ≠ 1 is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution.
11 
 
The resource constraint faced by the household-producer is given by 
 
(1+τC)CP(t) + ΔKP(t+1) + δP(t)·KP(t) + pI·KGI(t-1)                        (21) 
 
= (1-τY)Y(t) + wGLEG(t) + TR(t) + CGT(t), 
 
where pI·KGI(t-1) represents user fees on public infrastructure services (with pI the 
real price of these services,  measured in terms of the price of the domestic 
private commodity, assumed constant), wG(t)LEG(t) the public sector wage bill (with 
wG the real wage, measured in terms of the price of the private commodity, also 
                                                 
11An alternative and more general specification would be to assume as in Agénor and Neanidis 




1-1/σ/(1-1/σ), where κ ∈ (0,1). Coefficient κ (respectively, 1-κ) measures the relative 
contribution of consumption (respectively, health) to utility. This specification implies that utility is 
non-separable in consumption of goods and health services; an increase in consumption of health 
services raises the utility derived from consuming final goods. There is therefore gross 
complementarity. 
  12assumed constant), CGT(t) transfers from the government, TR(t) net private 
transfers from abroad (or remittances), τY ∈ (0,1) the tax rate on factor income, τC 
∈ (0,1) the tax rate on consumption spending, and δP(t) ∈ (0,1) the depreciation 
rate of private capital. For simplicity, we assume that public sector wages, as well 
as raw labor employed in private production, are not subject to direct taxation.
12 
We also assume that spending on health and education services are subject to the 
same tax rate as other components of private expenditure, τC. In addition, given 
that the household holds no domestic debt, interest payments on that debt do not 
appear as a resource in (21). 
 
  The discount rate ρ is endogenous, as a result of three factors. First, it 
depends negatively on consumption of health services, H(t), as in Agénor (2006). 
The idea here is that better health leads to a greater weight being attached to 
future consumption, and therefore tends to lower the degree of impatience. 
Second, it depends also negatively on total government spending on security, 
defined as the sum of spending on salaries of public employees involved in security 
(the army, the police, and the judiciary), given by wGχGSLEG(t), where χGS ∈ (0,1), 
and other current spending on security, given by CGS(t). The view here is that 
spending on security lowers violence, improves political stability, and raises private 
sector confidence in the economy’s future prospects; this tends to reduce 
preference for the present. Both of these effects tend therefore to increase private 
saving—and thus to stimulate investment and growth.
13 Third, as in Kam (2005), the 
rate of time preference is positively related to wealth—that is, the stock of private 
capital in the present context. This tends to lower saving and thus the rate of 
economic growth. 
 
                                                 
12Alternatively, for public sector workers, wages can be interpreted as net of taxes. 
13Improved health may also imply that the return to education may accrue over longer periods 
of time. This, in turn, would raise incentives to accumulate human capital, lower the rate of time 
preference, and stimulate saving and growth. However, in the present setting we cannot capture 
this effect directly, given the assumption of infinite horizon. 





-ρS,                  (22) 
 
where ρH, ρS > 0 and ρ0 is a base-period value. 
 
The accumulation equation for private physical capital is given by 
 
KP(t+1) = IP(t) + [1 - δP(t)]KP(t).                                 (23) 
 
As in Agénor (2005c), the rate of depreciation of the private capital stock, 
δP(t), is assumed to depend inversely on the ratio of public spending on core 
infrastructure maintenance, CGMI(t), to the stock of private capital, with a one-
period lag: 
 
δP(t) =  1 - εP[CGMI(t-1)/KP(t-1)]
χP,                                 (24) 
 
where  εP ∈ (0,1) and χP > 0.
15 Thus, maintenance expenditure on public infra-
structure enhances the durability of private capital. 
 
5.  Composition of Government Spending and Budget Constraint 
 
  The government collects taxes (on wages of educated workers, private 
capital income, and private consumption), and spends on goods and services 
(including for maintenance and security purposes). It also services its debt and 
invests in education, health, and core infrastructure. Education and health services 
are provided free of charge, whereas core infrastructure is subject to fees. It 
receives foreign assistance, which serves to balance the budget.  
                                                 
14As in Agénor (2006), the use of the private capital stock as a scale variable can be justified by a 
wealth effect.  
15These restrictions on coefficients εP and χP are sufficient to ensure that δP(t) ∈ (0,1) as long 
as CGMI(t-1)/KP(t-1) < 1, ∀t. 
  14 
  Formally, total government spending, G(t), is given by the sum of 
consumption (current) spending, CG(t), capital (investment) spending, IG(t), and 
interest payments: 
 
G(t) = CG(t) + IG(t) + rD·D(t-1),                                    (27) 
 
where D(t) is total government debt and rD the constant interest rate on that debt. 
 
  Current spending consists of salaries to public sector (educated) workers, 
wGLEG(t), spending on maintenance, CGM(t), spending on security (other than 
salaries for the army, police, and judiciary), CGS(t), transfers to households, 
CGT(t), and other spending on private commodities, CGO(t): 
 
CG(t) = wGLEG(t) + CGM(t) + CGS(t) + CGT(t) + CGO(t).                      (28) 
 
Spending on security and other items, as well as transfers to households, are 
assumed to be fixed fractions of output: 
 
CGj(t) = θj·Y(t),                                           (29) 
 
where θj  ∈ (0,1) and j = S,O,T. 
 
Maintenance outlays are assumed to be proportional to total depreciation of 
all components of the public capital stock: 
 
CGM(t) = ΣhCGMh(t) = ΣhθMh·δGh(t)·KGh(t-1),                      (30) 
 
where θMh > 0 is a scale parameter for capital stock h and δGh(t) ∈ (0,1) denotes the 
rate of depreciation of public capital in category h, with h = E,H,I. 
 
  15Total public investment is taken to be a fixed fraction of output: 
 
IG(t) = θIG·Y(t),                                               (31) 
 
where θIG > 0. 
 
Public investment is allocated to education, IGE, health, IGH, and core 
infrastructure, IGI, as well as a residual item, IGO: 
 
IG(t) = IGE(t) + IGH(t) + IGI(t)  + IGO(t).                              (32) 
 
Each component is given as a fixed fraction of total investment: 
 
IGh(t) = κh·IG(t),                                             (33) 
 
where κh ∈ (0,1), Σκh = 1, and h = E,H,I,O.  The coefficients κh are thus policy 
parameters, which can be used to study the impact of changes in the allocation of 
public investment. 
 
  Stocks of public capital in education, health, and infrastructure are given by  
 
KGh(t+1) = ϕ h·IGh(t) + [1 - δGh(t)]·KGh(t),                          (34) 
 
where ϕh ∈ (0,1) is a parameter that measures the efficiency of public investment, 
and h = E,H,I.
16 As discussed at length by Agénor, Bayraktar, and El Aynaoui (2007), 
the case ϕh < 1 reflects the fact that investment outlays are subject to 
inefficiencies, which tend to limit their positive impact on the public capital stock. 
The case of “full efficiency” corresponds to ϕh = 1. 
  
                                                 
16As in Agénor, Bayraktar, and El Aynaoui (2007), the residual category IGO(t) is assumed to 
have only demand-side (flow) effects, not supply-side effects. Consequently, we do not explicitly 
account for stock accumulation. 
  16The rate of depreciation of each public capital stock, δGh(t), depends 
inversely on the ratio of public spending on infrastructure maintenance, CGMI(t), to 
the relevant stock of public capital, with a one-period lag: 
 
δGh(t) =  1 - εGh[CGMh(t-1)/KGh(t-1)]
χGh,                             (35) 
 
where εGh ∈ (0,1) and χGh > 0, with h = E,H,I.
17 Thus, maintenance expenditure 
enhances the durability of public capital. 
 
We assume that taxes are subject to collection costs; these costs (which are 
measured in terms of the private commodities) reduce the yield of each tax j by a 
proportion qj  ∈ (0,1).
18 Put differently, tax collection costs are linear in tax 
revenues. We also assume that user fees are also subject to the same type of 
collection costs, which reduce net revenue by a proportion qI. Total government 
revenues, R(t), are thus given by  
 
R(t) = (1-qY)τYY(t) + (1-qC)τCCP(t) + (1-qI)pI·KGI(t-1).                  (36) 
 
Using (27) and (36), the government budget balance, B(t), is thus given by 
 
B(t) = R(t) + A(t) - G(t),                                         (37) 
 
where A(t) is the flow of aid, namely, grants. By definition, any budget surplus 
(deficit) must be matched by a reduction (increase) in debt, ΔD(t). In addition, we 
assume here that borrowing is a fixed fraction of output: 
 
ΔD(t) = - B(t) = θD·Y(t),                                        (38) 
 
                                                 
17These restrictions on coefficients εGh and χGh are sufficient to ensure that δGh(t) ∈ (0,1) as 
long as CGMh(t-1)/KGh(t-1) < 1, ∀t. 
18Collection costs refer here only to direct administrative costs incurred by governments. See 
Bird and Zolt (2005) for a further discussion. 
  17where θD ∈ (0,1). The budget balance is thus given from “below the line.” Given 
(37) and (38), the level of aid can be solved residually as 
 
A(t) = G(t) – R(t) - θD·Y(t).                                     (39) 
 
  In this mode, therefore, the model allows potential users to calculate aid 
requirements, for a given path of spending, taxes (net of collection costs), and 
borrowing. Alternatively, the model could be solved for a specific component of 
spending or taxes, for a given level of aid—as a share, for instance, of output, in 
the form A(t) = θA·Y(t), where θA ∈ (0,1). 
 
6.  Private Capital Formation 
 
  The budget constraint of the private sector, equation (21), together with 
(23), (29), and the assumption that remittances are fixed as a fraction θR ∈ (0,1) of 
output, can be rearranged to give 
 
IP(t) = (1+ θR + θT - τY)Y(t) + wGLEG(t) - (1 + τC)CP(t) - pI·KGI(t-1),              (40) 
 
which determines private investment.
19 
 
7.  Quality Indicators 
 
The indicators of quality of public capital, θI, θH, and θE, are all related 
through a logistic function to indicators of excess demand (or congestion) on public 
services, in each case with a one-period lag. The indicator of quality of public 
infrastructure, θI, is related to the ratio of public infrastructure capital itself to 
the stock of private capital: 
 
                                                 
19Consolidating the budget constraints (39), (40), and the current account (or foreign savings) 
gives the aggregate resource constraint of the economy. We do not specify it here, however, 
because we do not explicitly account for trade flows. 
  18θI(t) = θI0/{θI0 + (1 - θI0)·exp[-(KGI(t-1)/KP(t-1))]}.                       (41) 
  
The indicator of quality of public capital in health, θH, is related to the ratio 
of the stock of public capital in health to the size of the population: 
 
θH(t) = θH0/{θH0 + (1 - θH0)·exp[-(KGH(t-1)/N(t-1))]}.                    (42) 
 
The indicator of quality of public capital in education, θE, is related to 
 
  θE(t) = θE0/{θE0 + (1 - θE0)·exp[-(KGE(t-1)/χSH
G·STU(t-1)]}.                (43) 
 
This indicator is thus related to (the lagged value of) the ratio of the stock of 
public capital in education itself to the number of students attending public 
schools. This specification captures congestion effects in the public education 
system due to overcrowded classrooms, as discussed for instance in Agénor (2005a). 
The higher the number of students in public schools relative to the existing stock of 
capital in education, the lower the quality of that stock. 
 
Coefficients in all of these equations have the following properties: θh ∈ 
(0,1), θh → 1 if x → ∞, and θh → θh0 if x → 0, where x denotes the relevant ratio, 
and h = E,H,I. Thus, all quality indicators are bounded between zero and unity, and 
display a zone of “increasing returns.” 
 
 
III.  Equilibrium and the Balanced Growth Path 
 
In the present setting, a decentralized (perfect foresight) equilibrium can be 
defined as follows: 
 
Definition 1. A decentralized equilibrium is a set of infinite sequences for 
the quantities C(t), N(t), LE(t), KP(t), and KGh(t), for t=1 to ∞, and h=I,E,H, such 
  19that C(t) and KP(t) maximize equation (19) subject to (21), and N(t), LE(t), KP(t), 
and KGh(t) satisfy equations (8), (17), (23), and (34). 
 
  This equilibrium can be characterized as follows. The household-producer 
maximizes (19) subject to the budget constraint (21), taking the income and 
consumption tax rates, τ and τC, the discount rate, ρ(t), the depreciation rate, 
δP(t), spending on government-provided infrastructure services, pI·KGI(t-1), 
transfers, TR(t) and CGT(t), and wage payments, wGLEG(t), as given. Using (20), the 
current-value Hamiltonian for this problem can be written as 
 
H = log[H(t)] + [CP(t)]
1-1/σ/(1 - 1/σ) + λ(t)[(1-τY)Y(t) + wGLEG(t) 
 
- (1 + τC)CP(t) + TR(t) + CGT(t) - IP(t) - pI·KGI(t)], 
 
where λ(t) is the co-state variable associated with constraint (21). 
 
  Solution to this problem yields the familiar first-order conditions 
 
[C(t)]
-1/σ = (1 + τC)λ(t), 
 
λ(t+1)/λ(t) = [1 + ρ(t)]/[(1-τY)∂Y(t)/∂KP(t) + 1 - δP(t)], 
 
together with constraint (21) and the transversality condition  
 
limt → ∞λ(t)KP(t) = 0.                                         (44) 
 
The first condition equates the marginal utility of consumption to the 
shadow value of private capital, λ(t). The second is the standard Keynes-Ramsey 
consumption rule; the expression (1-τY)[∂Y(t)/∂KP(t)] is the after-tax marginal 
physical product of private capital. 
     
  20Combining the first-order conditions, using (22), and letting the marginal 
product of private capital be rP(t) = ∂Y(t)/∂KP(t), yields the Euler equation 
 
                 C(t+1)/C(t) = [ {(1-τY)rP(t) + 1- δP(t)}/                              (45) 
 





which determines the dynamics of consumption. From equations (5), (6), and (7), 
the marginal product of private capital is given by  
 
rP(t) = βY1·βV·(1-βJ)·Y(t)/KP(t).                                (46) 
  
In principle, the equations of the model could be further manipulated to 
lead to a condensed dynamic system of six nonlinear difference equations in terms 
of cP(t) = CP(t)/KP(t), n(t) = N(t)/KP(t), le(t) = LE(t)/KP(t), and kh(t) = KGh(t)/KP(t), 
for h = I,E,H.  These equations, together with the initial conditions n(0) = 
N(0)/KP(0), le(0) = LE(0)/KP(0), and kh(0) = KGh(0)/KP(0), for h = I,E,H, and the 
transversality condition (44) determine the dynamics of the decentralized 
economy. A balanced-growth path (BGP) can therefore be defined as follows: 
 
Definition 2. The BGP is a set of infinite sequences for the ratios c(t), n(t), 
le(t), and kh(t), for t=1 to ∞, and h = I,E,H, satisfying Definition 1, such that for 
initial conditions n(0), le(0), and kh(0), the difference equations characterizing the 
condensed dynamic system and the transversality condition (44) are satisfied, and 
consumption, population, the stock of educated labor, as well as the stocks of 
private and public capital, all grow at the same constant rate 1 + γ. 
 
Thus, in a steady state, c(t+1) = c(t) = c
SS, kh(t+1) = kh(t) = kh
SS, ∀h = I,H,E, 
etc., where the superscript SS is used to denote a steady-state value. By 
implication, output of both commodities and health services, H(t) and Y(t), also 
  21grow at the same constant rate, and the ratios h(t) = H(t)/KP(t) and y(t) = 




The steady-state growth rate can be written in many equivalent ways. In 
particular, from (45), we obtain 
 
1 + γ  = {[(1-τY)r
SS + 1 - δP
SS}/(1 + ρ
SS)}
σ.                             (47) 
 
Given the assumption of perfect foresight, consumption in the model is a 
jump variable. Thus c(t) is also a jump variable, whereas n(t), le(t) and kh(t) are all 
predetermined variables. Saddlepath stability requires therefore one unstable 
(positive) root. However, because of the relative complexity of the condensend 
dynamic system (six difference equations), Routh-Hurwicz conditions cannot be 
explicitly verified. Thus, it cannot be established analytically that the long-run 
equilibrium is saddlepoint stable and that the BGP is unique; even in a local sense, 
saddlepath stability is not guaranteed.  We will therefore turn to calibration and 
numerical techniques to analyse the properties of the model—and, in so doing, 
check whether stability holds under plausible values for the parameters. 
 
The Appendix provides a summary list of equations. 
 
 
IV.  Calibration and Solution 
 
This section describes the calibration of the model, prior to its subsequent 
use for analyzing the impact of public expenditure on growth. As indicated in the 
introduction, the calibration is done for Haiti, using country-specific information as 
well as parameter estimates from the literature that we deem relevant for low-
income countries.
20 The calibration is done throughout under the assumption that 
                                                 
20 There is therefore no country-specific econometric work in the present paper that deals with 
Haiti. Further technical work would of course help to refine our calculations, which remain illustrative in 
nature. 
  22the length of a period corresponds to a year. To facilitate the matching of 
equations and parameters between this section and Section II, we follow the 
presentation of the model in that section. 
 
1.  Calibration 
 
The model is calibrated for 2005, the most recent year for which we were able 
to construct a complete set of macro accounts. Data on national accounts and fiscal 
accounts were used to produce estimates. 
 
Consider first the production of health services. The share parameter βHC, 
which determines the roles of public capital in infrastructure and public capital in 
health in determining the “effective” capital stock in the production of health 
services (see equation (1)) is set at 0.3.  The share βH of medical personnel in the 
public production of health services (see equation (2)) is set at 0.6. In the same 
equation, the fraction χGH of the total public labor force that is employed as 
medical workers is set at 0.015, which corresponds to the value for Haiti in 2005.  
In equation (3), the share χPH of total private spending allocated by households to 
expenditure on health services is calculated as 0.032 for Haiti as well. 
 
  The share parameter βT in equation (4), which determines how the 
prevailing stock of educated labor in the private sector and health services are 
combined to create effective (educated) labor, is set at 0.7. 
  
In the production of commodities, the share parameter βJ, which determines 
how effective labor and the private capital stock are combined to produce the 
intermediate input J (see equation (5)), is set at 0.7. Similarly, the share 
parameter  βV, which determines how the composite input J and raw labor are 
combined to produce the intermediate input V (see equation (6)), is set at 0.8. 
 
  23In equation (7), we normalize output of commodities, Y at 168,000,000,000, 
which corresponds to the value of Haiti’s GDP in 2005. The stocks of public capital 
in infrastructure, health and education are taken to be relatively small to begin 
with. The infrastructure capital-output ratio is set at 0.6, the education capital-
output ratio at 0.3, and the health capital-output ratio is set at 0.3. Overall, the 
aggregate (weighted) public capital-output ratio is quite low by industrial-country 
standards, but it is consistent with the average estimate of the net public capital 
stock obtained by Arestoff and Hurlin (2005b, Table 3) for a large group of 
developing countries.
21  The ratio of private capital to output is set at 1.4. The 
resulting private-aggregate public capital ratio is thus about 1.1. Put differently, of 
the two components of physical capital, public capital is the relatively scarce 
factor; this is consistent with the view (shared by many observers) that lack of 
public infrastructure in low-income countries (including Haiti) is a major 
impediment to growth and private capital accumulation. Coefficients βY1 and βY2, 
which determine directly the relative importance of the composite input V and 
land, are set at 0.7 and 0.15, respectively; by comparison, the value of βY2  used 
by Hansen and Prescott (2002), for instance, is 0.3.  
 
The estimates of βY1 and βY2 imply that the elasticity of output of 
commodities with respect to public capital in infrastructure, given by 1-βY1-βY2, is 
equal to 0.15. This value corresponds to the one estimated by Easterly and Rebelo 
(1993) and used by Rioja (2005). By comparison, Baier and Glomm (2001) and Rioja 
and Glomm (2003) use an estimate of 0.1, which is close to the figure of 0.11 
estimated by Hulten (1996).
22 Calderon and Serven (2005) also estimate the 
elasticity of GDP to infrastructure (proxied by a synthetic index of physical assets 
that includes energy, roads, and telecommunications) to be 0.138 for a group of 
developing countries, whereas Suescun (2005, p. 15) focusing only on Colombia, 
found a value of 0.147. By comparison, Esfahani and Ramirez (2003, Table 4) found 
                                                 
21The Arestoff-Hurlin estimates are based on the perpetual inventory method, which consists 
essentially in cumulating total capital expenditure flows by central governments. 
22Baldacci, Hillman, and Kojo (2004, p. 533) found an elasticity of the growth rate per capita 
with respect to public capital expenditure that ranges from 0.06 to 0.08 for a group of 39 low-
income countries for the period 1999-2001. 
  24estimates of the elasticities of per capita GDP growth ranging from 0.08 to 0.16, 
when infrastructure capital is measured as the number of telephone lines or power 
generation capacity, whereas Canning (1999) estimates an elasticity of output per 
worker with respect to infrastructure (as measured by the number of telephone 
lines) that is on average 0.14 for his full sample, and close to 0.26 for higher-
income countries. Similarly, Arestoff and Hurlin (2005, Tables 2 and 7) found 
elasticities of output per worker ranging from 0.05 to 0.19 when infrastructure 
stocks are used, and from 0.04 to 0.22 when estimates of public capital stocks are 
used, in the absence of threshold effects. Thus, the estimate used here is 
consistent with the upper range of the values estimated by Esfahani and Ramirez, 
and Arestoff and Hurlin, as well as the lower range of Canning's results.
23 
 
It should also be noted that, given the multi-level Cobb-Douglas specification 
adopted here, the “true” elasticity of output with respect to educated labor is 
βT·βJ·βV·βY1, whereas the elasticity of output with respect to private capital is 
given by (1-βJ)·βV·βY1, given the above estimates, we obtain, respectively, 0.27 
and 0.17. The latter estimate is significantly lower than the share of private capital 
in output used in other studies, which is 0.36 for Alonso-Carrera and Freire-Serén 
(2004, p. 852), 0.4 for instance in Ortigueira (1998, p. 337) and Rivas (2003, Table 
1), and 0.45 in Rioja and Glomm (2003, Table 2). 
 
Consider now population and the production of education labor. The initial 
level of population is set at 8,536,844, which corresponds to Haiti’s population in 
2005. The growth rate of the total population in equation (9) is assumed to be 
constant, equal to 2.2 percent, which corresponds to Haiti’s value in 2005.  
 
In equation (10), coefficients aD and aS, which measure respectively the 
share of dependents and the share of students (both as a share of the total 
                                                 
23Colletaz and Hurlin (2006, Table 5), using a smooth threshold regression approach, found 
estimates ranging from 0.07 (for France, Ireland, and the United States, for instance) to values as 
high as 0.29 for Norway and 0.38 for Portugal.  
  25population) are calibrated as 0.252 and 0.163, which correspond to Haiti’s value in 
2005.  
 
The share parameter βEC, which determines how the effective stocks of 
public capital in infrastructure and education are combined to produce the 
composite input KGIE(t) (see equation (12)), is set at 0.35. Thus, infrastructure 
plays a relatively important role in determining how much physical capital is used 
in the education technology.  
 
In equation (13), the share parameter βZ, which determines how the 
composite public capital input and the number of teachers on government payroll 
are combined to produce the composite input Z, is set at 0.8. Thus, physical capital 
is as important as teachers in producing educated labor. In the same equation, the 
fraction  χGE representing the share of teachers in total public employment is 
calibrated as 0.176, equal to Haiti’s value in 2005.  
 
The share parameter βS, which determines how health services and the 
number of students are combined to determine the composite input SH (see 
equation (14)), is set at 0.8. In equation (15), the share parameter βE, which 
determines how the composite inputs SH and Z are combined to determine the 
number of newly-educated workers by the public sector, is set at 0.6. In this 
equation, the share of the “effective” supply of students enrolled in the public 
schools, χSH
G, is simply set equal to the share of actual students enrolled in that 
sector, which is 0.185 for Haiti in the base period. 
  
Given the nested structure of the model, the “true” elasticity of the 
production of newly-educated workers by the public sector with respect to the 
public capital stock in education is given by (1-βEC)·(1-βZ)·(1-βE). From the 
estimates above, this value is 0.052.  Although our estimate is smaller than the 
value used by Chen (2005), it is close to the value used by Rioja (2005) and the 
econometric estimate obtained by Blankenau et al. (2005) for their full sample. 
  26Similarly, Perli and Sakellaris (1998) used a share of physical capital in final output 
of the education sector between 0.11 and 0.17. The estimate used here is probably 
quite appropriate for the group of low-income countries where education (at least 
at the primary and secondary levels) is to a very large extent publicly provided.
24 
 
In equation (16), the share χPE of total private spending allocated by 
households to expenditure on health services is calibrated as  0.047 for Haiti in the 
base year. The share ηNE, which measures the base-period ratio of the number of 
educated individuals “produced” by private schools and private spending on 
education, is set at 0.00002, which represents the figure observed for Haiti in 2005. 
In (15) and (16), to estimate the flow variables NE(t) and NE
G(t), we proceed as 
follows.  We first calculate the change in the total number of people who become 
literate within a year, by taking literacy rates in two consecutive years, multiplying 
them by the total population in that year, and taking the absolute difference. This 
gives us an estimate of NE(t). We then apply to that estimate the actual share of 
students enrolled in public schools to obtain an estimate of NE
G(t). 
 
In equation (17), the rate of attrition of the educated labor force is set at 
0.01. This compares to a value of 0.1 used by Alonso-Carrera and Freire-Serén 
(2004, p. 852) as an estimate of the rate of depreciation of human capital. In 
equation (18), the coefficient proportion aGE, which measures the share of public 
sector employment in the total supply of educated workers, is calculated as 0.015, 
whereas aPE and aPH, the shares of the educated labor force involved in the private 
production of education and health services, respectively, are calculated as 0.017 
and 0.001, all of which are the values for Haiti in 2005.  By implication, the share 
of educated workers employed in private production of commodities, 1-aPE-aPH–aGE, 
is equal to 0.967. This gives an initial private capital-educated labor ratio in 
private production of 78,581, and an overall capital-labor ratio of 87, 480. Keeping 
in mind that "educated labor" in the present context includes both skilled and 
                                                 
24Blankenau et al. (2005) found that the elasticity of human capital with respect to government 
spending on education is close to zero for low-income countries, but this runs counter to intuition. It 
also does not account for the heterogeneity in public school enrollment discussed in the conclusion. 
  27unskilled workers employed in production, these ratios (together with the capital-
output ratios mentioned earlier) capture fairly well the view that the country 
considered is poor and endowed with a relatively abundant supply of labor (with 
only part of it educated), while facing at the same time a relative scarcity of 
physical (particularly public) capital. 
 
In equation (20), σ, the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, is set at 0.4. 
This relatively low value is consistent with the evidence indicating that the 
intertemporal elasticity of substitution tends to be low at low levels of income (see 
Ogaki, Ostry and Reinhart (1996) and Agénor and Montiel (2007)), a result that may 
reflect either short planning horizons or liquidity constraints, as discussed for 
instance by Agénor (2004, Chapter 2).
25 
 
In the resource constraint of the private sector, equation (21), private 
consumption is set at 93.3 percent of output. This value is quite sensible for many 
low-income countries, where limited private resources are allocated to savings and 
investment. It corresponds to the value observed for Haiti in 2005. The tax rate on 
(factor) income, τY, is calculated as 0.042, whereas the tax rate on consumption is 
calculated as 0.057, both of which correspond to the values observed for Haiti in 
2005. The first value is in line with actual ratios for many low-income countries, 
where taxation (which is essentially indirect in nature) provides a more limited 
source of revenue than in higher-income countries. The coefficient θO in that 
equation, which measures the share of other current government spending 
allocated to transfers to households, is calculated as 0.009, which corresponds to 
the value observed for Haiti in 2005. 
 
Coefficients ρH and ρS in the discount rate function (equation (22)) are set 
at 0.01, respectively. The estimate of the first coefficient is based on the results in 
Lawrance (1991), who identified an (inverse) relationship between the rate of time 
                                                 
25Of course, using even lower values of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution would "flatten" 
the response of consumption to shocks. However, they would not affect the direction of the effect 
discussed below. 
  28preference and the level of income, with an elasticity of 0.058 (Table 1, page 65). 
Assuming that spending on health is services is more or less proportional to income 
(or expenditure, given the low degree of intertemporal substitution), this elasticity 
can be used as an approximation of proportional to ρH. To ensure a reasonable 
initial value of the discount rate (given the values of ρH and ρS and the initial 
values of H(t)/KP(t) and CGS(t)/KP(t)), we set ρ0 such that the value of ρ in the 
initial period is equal to 0.04. In this case, ρ0 is equal to 0.037. The rate of time 
preference, ρ, is set at 4 percent, a fairly conventional choice in this literature. 
This leads to a discount factor of approximately 0.96 (see, for instance, Canton 
(2001, Table 1), and Ghosh and Roy (2004, Tables 1 and 2)). 
 
In equation (24), the rate of depreciation of the private capital stock, δP(t), 
is defined in such a way that its initial value is equal to 6.8 percent. This value 
corresponds to the average value estimated by Bu (2006, Table 7) for three low-
income countries in Africa. In that equation, we set χP = 0.002, and then calibrated  
εP as 0.94. 
 
Turning now to the government budget, in equation (27), the effective 
interest rate on the public debt is calculated as 0.024. The shares of current and 
capital spending in total government spending are set equal to 0.64 and 0.3 
respectively, implying a share of interest payments of 0.06. These shares 
correspond to those observed for Haiti in 2005. 
 
In equation (28), the shares of salaries to public sector workers, maintenance, 
spending on security (other than salaries), and transfers in total current spending are 
equal to 0.38, 0.11, 0.15, and 0.27, respectively, implying a share of spending on 
other categories of 0.1. These shares imply that, the coefficients θj in equations (29), 
which measure the shares of spending on security (excluding salaries of security 
personnel), transfers, and other items in GDP, are equal to 0.014, 0.009, and 0.024, 
respectively. In equation (30), the coefficients θMI, θMH,and θME,is set so that the value 
  29of total spending on maintenance for each item is indeed equal to their share in total 
current spending, that is, 0.40, 0.23, and 0.21, respectively. 
 
Coefficient  θI, which measures in equation (31) the share of total public 
investment in GDP is equal to 0.04, the value for Haiti in 2005. The allocation of 
public investment between education, health, infrastructure, and other categories, 
is determined by the coefficients κE,  κH, κI,  κO, which are calculated as 0.053, 
0.054, 0.36, and 0.53, respectively. These ratios correspond to those observed for 
Haiti in 2005. 
 
  In equation (34), the degree of (in)efficiency of public investment, that is, 
ϕh for h = E,H,I, is set uniformly at 0.5. Arestoff and Hurlin (2005) found values of ϕ 
ranging from 0.4 to 0.6 for a group of developing countries. In the experiments 
reported below, we use at first the uniform value of 0.5, and perform subsequently 
a sensitivity analysis. In equation (35), the rates of depreciation of each capital 
stock, δGh(t), is set so that the ratios are equal to 2.5 percent in the base period. 
Similar values are used by Agénor, Bayraktar, and El Aynaoui (2007), and Pinto 
Moreira and Bayraktar (2007). The coefficient χGh is set at 0.001, and then  εGh is 
calibrated as 0.979.  
 
In equation (36), the coefficients measuring the tax collection costs, qC and 
qY, are set at 0.03 and 0.06 respectively, whereas the cost of collecting 
infrastructure fees qI, is set at 0.06. Thus, collecting income taxes and fees are 
assumed to be twice as costly as collecting consumption taxes.
26 The value of 0.03 
corresponds to the average of administrative costs (in proportion of taxes 
collected) estimated by Gallagher (2005, p. 127) for a group of low-income 
developing countries. In equation (38), the coefficient θD, which measures the ratio 
of borrowing (both domestic and foreign) as a fixed fraction of output is set at 
0.007, which corresponds to the value observed for Haiti in 2005. 
                                                 
26Note that we assume that the cost of collecting taxes on both components of factor income 
(wages and profits) is the same. In practice, however, collection costs may be higher for non-wage 
income. See Agénor and Neanidis (2006) for a more detailed discussion. 
  30 
In the private investment equation (40), the share of foreign transfers as a 
proportion of GDP, θR, is set at 0.21, which corresponds to the value observed for 
total transfers for Haiti in 2005. Finally, for the quality indicators defined in (41), 
(42), and (43), coefficients θh0 are chosen so that the initial values of these 
indicators is relatively low, at 0.4. 
 
2.  Solution Procedure 
 
Calibration of the model around these initial values and parameters (which 
involves also determining appropriate multiplicative constants in the production 
functions for health services, commodities, educated labor, etc.) produces the 
baseline solution. Given the values described above the initial steady-state growth 
rate is equal to 2 percent. 
 
Private consumption, in the model, is a forward-looking variable. To account 
for initial jumps in that variable, we use the “extended path” method of Fair and 
Taylor (1984) to generate numerical solutions.
27 This procedure is quite convenient 
because it allows one to solve perfect foresight models in their nonlinear form, 
through an iterative process. The terminal condition imposed on consumption (the 
only forward-looking variable here) is that its growth rate at the terminal horizon 
(t+10 periods here) must be equal to the growth of the private capital stock, given 
the condition that cP(t) = CP(t)/KP(t) must be constant along the balanced growth 
path. In the next section, we examine the baseline solution and the results of 
various simulations. 
 
3.  Baseline Solution 
 
  We need to build a baseline scenario to be able to conduct policy 
experiments with the model. In the baseline scenario, budget deficit as a share of 
                                                 
27See Kolsrud (2001) for a compact presentation of the Fair-Taylor algorithm and a comparison 
with other solution techniques. 
  31GDP is taken fixed to make aid endogenous. It should be noted that this closure 
rule can be changed. The shares of all other components of spending remain 
constant at base period values. The efficiency parameter of public investment is 
equal to the uniform value of 0.5.  
 
Table 1 presents the baseline scenario. Given that current conditions 
continue, the growth rate of real GDP per capita at market prices is estimated to 
increase only slightly which is basically caused by the supply side effect of 
increasing public investment as a share of GDP from 4.5 percent to 5.7 percent, 
and private investment from 32.3 percent in 2007 to 38.1 percent in 2015. The low 
growth rate leads to a minor drop in the poverty rate whether we use Ravallion’s 
adjusted elasticity or the growth elasticity of -1.0 (See Figure 1). For example, the 
poverty rate with Ravallion’s adjusted elasticity decreases from 55.0 percent in 
2007 to 52.8 percent in 2015. If the current trends were to be maintained, the 
prospects of reducing poverty would not be realized and the MDGs of halving poverty 
by 2015 would not be achieved. Thus the results indicate that approximately 5 




V.  Policy Experiments 
 
This section illustrates the properties and implications of the model by 
considering six different policy experiments: an increase in public investment 
(financed by aid); a budget-neutral reallocation of spending toward health; an 
improvement in fiscal management that takes the alternative forms of a reduction 
in collection costs,  an increase in security spending; and a composite fiscal 
package, that combines elements of all the individual experiments listed above. In 
line with the favorable international environment that Haiti faces currently, all 
  32experiments are conducted under the assumption that the overall budget deficit is 




1.  Increase in Public Investment 
 
Our first experiment consists of a temporary increase in total public 
investment in GDP by 5 percentage points starting in 2008 until 2011, then 
dropping by 1 percentage point each year after that, to eventually return to the 
initial baseline value.  We consider two variants: first, the case where the 
efficiency parameter of public investment is constant throughout at 0.5, and the 
second the case where the efficiency parameter (for all categories of public 
investment) improves gradually over time. In both scenarios, investment is totally 
financed by foreign aid, due to the closure rule described earlier. 
 
Simulation results for the first variant are shown in Table 2. As in all 
subsequent tables, they are displayed as absolute differences from the baseline 
scenario.  
 
The direct effect of the increase in public investment is on the stock of 
public capital in infrastructure, which tends to stimulate output. Because the 
growth in output exceeds the increase in consumption, private capital formation 
expands.
29 By 2015, private investment increases by nearly 1.7 percentage points 
of GDP. Thus, the rise in public investment crowds in private investment through 
an indirect complementarity effect. In turn, the increase in private investment 
raises the stock of private capital over time; this, combined with the increase in 
the stock of public capital in infrastructure, tends to increase the marginal 
productivity of all other production inputs. At the same time, the rise in public 
                                                 
28As indicated earlier, one could also consider the case where aid is fixed in proportion of GDP, 
with the balancing item in the budget being either a component of non-interest expenditure, or a 
tax rate. 
  33investment in education leads to an increase in the stock of capital in education 
and the public education input, and therefore to a higher supply of educated 
workers.
30 In addition to improvements in the public infrastructure and education 
capital stock, the increase in the stock of public capital in health raises the 
efficiency of educated labor in production. The productivity gains associated with 
the combined effect of improved effective labor, and increased marginal 
productivity of all inputs, contribute to higher output. In terms of growth rates, 
output per capita remains on a sustained basis at 0.3 percentage points above its 
level in the baseline case. However, although growth is higher, it is not enough to 
entail a substantial drop in the poverty rate; even in the case of neutral growth 
elasticity, the poverty rate drops by only 1.1 percentage points by 2015 (See Figure 
2).  
sources—a key policy challenge in Haiti, as in many 
other developing countries. 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
In the second variant, in addition to higher public investment as described 
above, efficiency of all categories of public investment is assumed to improve 
uniformly over time. Specifically, we assume that the efficiency parameter remains 
constant at 0.5 in 2006 and 2007, and then increases to 0.8 by 0.1 point each year 
between 2008 and 2010. After 2010, it remains constant at 0.8. This case may 
represent the reforms aimed at improving governance and eliminating 
mismanagement of public re
 
Table 3 summarizes the simulation results. Now, because of improved 
efficiency of public investment, the rate of accumulation of all categories of public 
capital is higher, thereby magnifying productivity effects on private inputs. In turn, 
higher rates of factor accumulation lead to higher growth rates of GDP per capita, 
relative to the first variant. For example, Table 3 shows that the growth rate of 
output relative to the baseline value rises to 0.6 in 2015, whereas it was only 0.2 in 
 
29In the model, given that the estimate of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution that we use is 
relatively low (in line with the evidence for low-income countries), consumption smoothing is 
significant, implying relatively small changes over time in private expenditure.  
  34Table 2. This higher growth rate of GDP per capita translates into a lower poverty 
rate (See Figure 3). With a growth elasticity of -1.0, the drop in the poverty rate 
reaches 2.5 percentage points by 2015 (relative to the baseline scenario) in case of 
higher efficiency of public investment, compared to 1.1 percent drop with the first 
variant of the experiment. 
.  Spending Reallocation 
 
pact (although 
they may change subsequently, given the dynamics of the model).   
entive to save (which results from a 
reduction in the rate of time preference). 




Our third experiment is a typical “fiscal space” experiment. It consists of 
two components. First, starting in 2008, there is a permanent reduction of 1 
percentage point of GDP in “other” public spending which is reallocated to 
investment (across the board, that is, keeping constant the initial shares in public 
capital formation). Second, the share of the residual category “other” in public 
investment is reduced permanently by 5 percentage points, with the whole amount 
reallocated to investment in health. Given that the experiment consists of a 
spending reallocation, foreign aid requirements do not change on im
 
The simulation results are presented in Table 4. The impact on output 
growth per capita is relatively weak. It increases only by 0.1 percentage points by 
2015. As a result, the effect on poverty is weak as well (See Figure 4). The 
proportion of poor drops by only 0.2 percentage points in the case of a neutral-
growth elasticity. Thus, the results indicate that, by itself, and given the 
magnitude of the shock, higher public health investment is not enough to have a 
strong impact on growth, despite its positive effect on the productivity of the labor 
force and its positive effect on the inc
 
 
30The ratio of educated workers to population changes only slightly, however, due to a 
relatively low degree of substitution between teachers and public capital stock in the production of 
education services. 
  353.  Tax Reform 
 
the 
additional resources generated by the tax reform are allocated to investment. 
y of all production inputs. As a result, output drops and poverty 
worsens.  
rivate savings and investment may well 
lead to lower growth and higher poverty. 
In this set of experiments, collection costs are reduced by half starting in 
2008 and the effective direct tax rate is increased by 1 percentage point over three 
years, starting in 2008.  We consider again two variants: first, we assume that 
public spending does not change; second, we consider the case where 
 
The results of the first variant are shown in Table 5. The direct effect of the 
tax reform is an increase in tax revenues. But given that public spending does not 
change, and that the budget deficit is constant, the increase in revenues translates 
almost one to one into a fall in foreign aid requirements (See Figure 5). Moreover, 
the impact on growth is largely negative: higher income taxes tend to induce 
households to consume more today and to reduce saving rates. As a result of this 
intertemporal effect, private investment drops, thereby lowering the marginal 
productivit
 
In the second variant, we reallocate (across the board) the additional 
revenues generated by higher income taxes and lower collection costs, to public 
investment.  The results are shown in Table 6. This time around, private 
investment increases as well due to the improvement in the public infrastructure 
capital stock which stimulates output (and thus after-tax income) and savings. As a 
r e s u l t ,  t h e  i m p a c t  o n  g r o w t h  i s  p o s i t i v e . The growth rate of output per capita 
increases by 0.8 percentage points by 2015, compared to a 0.1 percentage point 
drop in Table 5. Thus, the poverty rate declines now by 2.4 percent by 2015, in the 
case of a neutral growth elasticity (See Figure 6). This last experiment illustrates 
well the importance of reallocating additional revenue from fiscal reforms to 
investment (assuming that external financing conditions do not change). Otherwise, 
the disincentive effects of taxation on p
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4.  Increase in Security Spending 
 
ase, 
there are almost no discernible effects on growth and poverty (See Figure 7).  
s. This generates therefore a stronger effect on 
private investment and growth. 
.  A Composite Fiscal Package 
 
 a composite fiscal package, which combines several of the 
previous experiments. 
 
This experiment consists of an increase in security spending by 3 percentage 
points of GDP between 2008 and 2011, followed by an increase of 2.5 percent in 
2012, 2 percent in 2013, and 1.5 percent in 2014 and 2015. Given the budget 
closure rule, higher security spending is essentially financed by foreign aid, which 
rises at about the same rate. Table 7 presents the simulation results when the 
elasticity of security spending, ρS, in Equation (22) is taken to be 0.01. In this c
 
By contrast, Table 8 shows the results when the elasticity of security 
spending, ρS, is equal to 0.1. Conceptually, this case corresponds to a situation 
where security concerns have a relatively large impact on agents’ rate of 
preference for the present; in such conditions, improvements in security, to the 
extent that they translate into reductions in crime and violence, may translate into 
greater incentives to “think about” the future, and thus to save. Indeed, the 
results show that the impact of higher security spending on growth is now quite 
significant. The growth rate rises by about 0.1 percentage points by 2015, whereas 
the poverty rate drops by about 0.12 by 2015 when the growth elasticity is neutral 
(See Figure 8). Again, the higher value of ρS leads to a higher growth rate because 
private sector confidence in the economy’s future prospects improves more with 
higher security spending. By inducing a greater reduction in preference for the 




  371.  An increase in total public investment in GDP by 5 percentage points starting 
in 2008 until 2011, then dropping by 1 percentage point each year after 
2011; 
2.  A permanent reduction of 1 percentage point of GDP, starting in 2008, in the 
“other” category of public spending which is reallocated (across the board) 
to investment, with at the same time a permanent reduction in the share of 
the category “other” in public investment by 5 percentage points, 
reallocated in its entirety to health; 
3.  An increase in the effective indirect tax rate to 6 percentage points starting 
in 2008; 
4.  An increase in the direct tax rate by 1 percent for 3 years, starting in 2008; 
5.  An increase in security spending by 3 percentage points of GDP between 
2008 and 2011, 2.5 percent in 2012, 2 percent in 2013, and 1.5 percent in 
2014 and 2015. 
6.  A reduction in collection costs by half, starting in 2008. 
 
Table 9 presents the simulation results. We observe two opposite effects on 
growth and poverty. As the tax rates increase, people start saving less, as discussed 
earlier. As a result private investment and private capital accumulation slows 
down. This leads to an initial negative impact on the fiscal package on growth and 
poverty. But at the same time, the higher tax rates and lower collection costs raise 
government revenue, which increases public investment and thus the various 
components of public capital. Over time, the larger public capital stock, directly 
and indirectly, raises saving and investment, increases output, and lowers poverty. 
In the medium term, the impact on growth turns out to be positive. While the 
growth rate of real GDP per capita increases by 0.5 on average, the poverty rate 
with a growth elasticity of -1.0 drops by 2.2 percent in 2015 (See Figure 9).  
 
If the elasticity of security spending, ρS, rises, the effect on growth 
improves slightly. Table 10 shows the simulation results when ρS is taken as 0.1 
instead of 0.01, as in Table 9. In this case, private investment increases more, 
  38because (as discussed earlier) private sector confidence in the economy’s future 
prospects improves. This leads to a higher rate of output growth and lower poverty 
(See Figure 10).  
 
The impact on growth improves even more if the government applies a lower 
increase in the direct tax rate and makes it effective later. Table 11 shows the 
case when the direct tax rate increases by 0.5 percentage points only between 
2010 and 2013 and then stays constant. The lower rise in the direct tax rate leads a 
lower drop in savings during the initial phase of adjustment, and therefore to a 
lower negative effect on private investment. In this case, the growth rate of real 
GDP per capita increases by 0.53 percentage points on average, compared to the 
0.5 increase shown in Table 9. As a result, the poverty rate (with a growth 
elasticity of -1.0) decreases by 2.5 percentage points in 2015, instead of 2.2 (See 
Figure 11). Table 12 shows that the effect of changes in fiscal policy on growth and 
poverty get even better when the elasticity of security spending is raised to 0.1, 
given that in this case it leads to higher private investment (See Figure 12). 
 
 
VI. Concluding Remarks and Policy Implications 
 
This paper presents a small-scale intertemporal model of endogenous growth 
in which the composition of public expenditure, and externalities associated with 
infrastructure, in terms of its impact on education and health, are explicitly 
accounted for. One of the key features of the model is that government spending is 
disaggregated into different components such as maintenance, security, and 
investment in education, health, and infrastructure. In addition, it also accounts 
for improved political stability and reduction in violence.  
 
The model is applied to Haiti to derive policy implications useful for both 
policymakers and donors. The policy experiments include an increase in public 
investment and its efficiency, a “fiscal space” exercise involving a reallocation of 
spending, a strengthening of fiscal management taking the form of a reduction in 
  39tax collection costs, an increase in security spending, and a composite fiscal 
package.  
 
Overall, the results of our policy experiments illustrate that the impact of 
changes in fiscal policy will depend on how it affects the behavior of the private 
sector (notably through incentives to save and invest) and how additional revenue 
is allocated by the government. Regarding the latter, it is worth pointing out that 
even tax reforms that are considered to be highly regressive (involving sharp 
increases in indirect tax rates) may end up being beneficial to the poor, to the 
extent that the resources that they generate are allocated to productive capital 
accumulation. Moreover, these effects may vary in opposite direction over time: 
effects on poverty may be negative short-term but may be become favorable over 
time. Thus, dynamic trade-offs may emerge in the design of fiscal reforms and 
using a dynamic model (such as the one developed in this paper) is essential to 
capture them.  
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Summary List of Equations 
 
 
Production of Health Services and Effective Labor 
 
     KGIH(t) = AHC·[θI(t)·KGI(t)]
βHC·[θH(t)·KGH(t)]








1-βT                                         (A3) 
 












1-βY1-βY2                                (A6) 
 
Population, Labor Supply, and Schooling Technology 
  
N(t) = [1+ gN(t)]·N(t-1)                                            (A7) 
 
gN(t) = gN
0 + βN[CP(t-1)/N(t-1)] - βNN[CP(t-1)/N(t-1)]
2                      (A8) 
 
LA(t) = (1 - aD - aS)·N(t)                                        (A9) 
 
 
LR(t) = LA(t) – LE(t)                                           (A10) 
 
 
     KGIE(t) = AEC·[θI(t)·KGI(t)]
βEC·[θE(t)·KGE(t)]
1-βEC                    (A11) 
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Z(t) = AZ·[χGE·LEG(t)]
βZ·[KGIE(t)]










1-βE                                  (A14) 
 
NE(t) = NE
G(t) + ηNE·χPE·CP(t)                                       (A15) 
 
LE(t+1) = NE(t) + (1 - δE)·LE(t)                                     (A16) 
 
LEP(t) = (1 - aPE - aPH – aGE)LE(t)                                     (A17) 
 




-ρS                  (A18) 
 
                 C(t+1)/C(t) = [{(1-τY)rP(t) + 1- δP(t)}/[1 + ρ(t)]}
σ                         (A19) 
 
rP(t) = βY1·βV·(1-βJ)·Y(t)/KP(t)                                     (A20) 
 
KP(t+1) = IP(t) + [1 - δP(t)]KP(t)                                     (A21) 
 
δP(t) =  1 - εP[CGMI(t-1)/KP(t-1)]
χP                                    (A22) 
 
Composition of Public Spending and Budget Constraint  
 
G(t) = CG(t) + IG(t) + rD·D(t-1)                                     (A23) 
 
CG(t) = wGLEG(t) + CGM(t) + CGS(t) + CGT(t) + CGO(t)                   (A24) 
 
  42CGj(t) = θj·Y(t),       j = S,O,T                                      (A25) 
 
CGM(t) = θM·ΣhCGMh(t) = θM·ΣhδGh(t)·KGh(t-1)                          (A26) 
 
IG(t) = θI·Y(t)                                               (A27) 
 
IGh(t) = κh·IG(t),          h = E,H,I,O                   (A28) 
 
KGh(t) = ϕ h·IGh(t-1) + [1 - δGh(t)]·KGh(t-1)                           (A29) 
 
δGh(t) =  1 - εGh[CGMh(t-1)/KGh(t-1)]
χGh                              (A30) 
 
T(t) = (1-qY)τYY(t) + (1-qC)τCCP(t) + (1-qI)pI·KGI(t-1)                    (A31) 
 
A(t) = G(t) – T(t) - θD·Y(t)                                     (A32) 
 
Q(t) = qYτYY(t) + qCτC·CP(t) + qIpI·KGI(t-1)                          (A33) 
 
Private Capital Formation 
 
IP(t) = (1+θR+θT-τY)Y(t) + wGLEG(t) + θO·CGO(t) - (1 + τC)CP(t) - pI·KGI(t-1)       (A34) 
 
Stocks of Public Capital: Quality Indicators 
 
θI(t) = θI0/{θI0 + (1 - θI0)·exp[-(KGI(t-1)/KP(t-1))]}                       (A35) 
 
θH(t) = θH0/{θH0 + (1 - θH0)·exp[-(KGH(t-1)/N(t-1))]}                     (A36) 
 
θE(t) = θE0/{θE0 + (1 - θE0)·exp[-(KGE(t-1)/χSH
G·STU(t-1)]}                  (A37) 
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2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Real GDP per capita at market prices (% change) 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.3
Poverty rate-Ravallion's adjusted elasticity (Gini = 66.0) 55.5 55.3 55.2 55.1 55.0 54.8 54.8 54.7 54.6
Poverty rate-Growth elasticity of -1.0 55.0 54.6 54.3 53.9 53.6 53.4 53.1 52.9 52.8
Government Sector (% of GDP)
Total resources (including grants) 13.5 13.9 14.3 14.7 14.7 14.7 14.7 14.7 14.7
  Total revenues 9.6 9.6 9.5 9.5 9.4 9.4 9.4 9.5 9.5
       Direct taxes 3.9 3.9 3.9 3.9 3.9 3.9 3.9 3.9 3.9
       Indirect taxes 4.9 4.8 4.7 4.7 4.6 4.6 4.6 4.6 4.6
       User fees 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9
   Foreign aid (grants) 3.9 4.3 4.8 5.2 5.2 5.2 5.2 5.2 5.2
T o t a l  e x p e n d i t u r e 1 1 . 81 2 . 21 2 . 61 2 . 91 2 . 91 2 . 91 2 . 91 3 . 01
    Spending on goods and services (total) 6.6 6.6 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.6 6.6
       Spending on maintenance 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7
       Wages and salaries 3.4 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.6 3.6 3.6 3.7
       Security 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4
       Other 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9
   Investment 4.5 4.9 5.3 5.7 5.7 5.7 5.7 5.7 5.7
   Interest payments 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7
Overall fiscal balance including grants (cash basis) 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7
Memorandum items
Private investment (% of GDP) 32.3 34.1 35.6 36.7 37.6 38.1 38.4 38.3 38.1
Public investment (% of total public expenditure) 32.1 34.0 35.8 37.5 37.5 37.5 37.5 37.5 37.4
   Health (% of public investment) 5.4 6.4 7.4 8.4 9.4 9.4 9.4 9.4 9.4
   Infrastructure (% of public investment) 36.4 36.9 37.4 37.9 38.9 39.9 39.9 39.9 39.9
   E d u c a t i o n  ( %  o f  p u b l i c  i n v e s t m e n t ) 7 . 3 9 . 31 1 . 31 3 . 31 5 . 31 5 . 31 5 . 31 5 . 31
   Other (% of public investment) 50.9 47.4 43.9 40.4 36.4 35.4 35.4 35.4 35.4
Aid (% of total revenue) 40.3 45.3 50.3 55.0 55.4 55.5 55.5 55.3 55.0
Total Aid (% of public investment) 85.3 87.6 89.3 90.5 90.9 91.0 91.1 91.0 90.9
Total debt (% of GDP) 29.0 28.8 28.7 28.6 28.5 28.5 28.5 28.6 28.7
Educated labor (in % of population) 37.4 37.8 38.3 38.8 39.3 39.8 40.4 40.9 41.5
Note: The “adjusted” elasticity formula proposed by Ravallion (2004) is -9.3*(1-Gini)^3 = -1.13 where Gini index is 50.5 for Haiti.
Years
Table 1






  482007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Real GDP per capita at market prices (% change) 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.2
Poverty rate-Ravallion's adjusted elasticity (Gini = 66.0) 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 -0.3 -0.3 -0.4 -0.4
Poverty rate-Growth elasticity of -1.0 0.0 0.0 -0.2 -0.3 -0.5 -0.7 -0.9 -1.0 -1.1
Government Sector (% of GDP)
Total resources (including grants) 0.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 4.0 3.0 2.0 1.0
  Total revenues 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
       Direct taxes 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
       Indirect taxes 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1
       User fees 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1
   Foreign aid (grants) 0.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 4.0 3.0 2.0 1.0
Total expenditure 0.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 4.0 3.0 2.0 1.0
    Spending on goods and services (total) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
       Spending on maintenance 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
       Wages and salaries 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1
       Security 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
      Other 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
   Investment 0.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 4.0 3.0 2.0 1.0
   Interest payments 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Overall fiscal balance including grants (cash basis) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Memorandum items
Private investment (% of GDP) 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.5 0.8 1.1 1.4 1.6 1.7
Public investment (% of total public expenditure) 0.0 16.9 16.1 15.4 15.4 13.0 10.3 7.3 3.9
   Health (% of public investment) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
   Infrastructure (% of public investment) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
   Education (% of public investment) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
   Other (% of public investment) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
A i d  ( %  o f  t o t a l  r e v e n u e ) 0 . 05 2 . 35 2 . 85 3 . 15 3 . 24 2 . 73 1 . 92 1 . 21
Total Aid (% of public investment) 0.0 6.2 5.2 4.4 4.2 3.6 2.9 2.1 1.0
Total debt (% of GDP) 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.2 -0.3 -0.4 -0.4 -0.5 -0.5
Educated labor (in % of population) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.002 0.003 0.004 0.006
Years
Table 2
Haiti : Higher Total Public Investment,  2007-15





  492007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Real GDP per capita at market prices (% change) 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.6
Poverty rate-Ravallion's adjusted elasticity (Gini = 66.0) 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.3 -0.4 -0.6 -0.7 -0.8 -1.0
Poverty rate-Growth elasticity of -1.0 0.0 0.0 -0.3 -0.7 -1.1 -1.5 -1.9 -2.2 -2.5
Government Sector (% of GDP)
Total resources (including grants) 0.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 4.9 3.9 2.9 1.9 0.9
  T o t a l  r e v e n u e s 0 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 0- 0 . 1- 0 . 1- 0 . 1-
       Direct taxes 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
       Indirect taxes 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2
       User fees 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2
   Foreign aid (grants) 0.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 4.0 3.0 2.0 0.9
Total expenditure 0.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 4.9 3.9 2.9 1.9 0.9
    Spending on goods and services (total) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1
       Spending on maintenance 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1
       Wages and salaries 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2
       Security 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
      Other 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
   Investment 0.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 4.0 3.0 2.0 1.0
   Interest payments 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Overall fiscal balance including grants (cash basis) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Memorandum items
Private investment (% of GDP) 0.0 0.0 0.5 1.1 1.7 2.3 2.9 3.4 3.8
Public investment (% of total public expenditure) 0.0 16.9 16.2 15.5 15.5 13.1 10.4 7.4 4.1
   Health (% of public investment) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
   Infrastructure (% of public investment) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
   Education (% of public investment) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
   Other (% of public investment) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
A i d  ( %  o f  t o t a l  r e v e n u e ) 0 . 05 2 . 35 3 . 05 3 . 45 3 . 54 2 . 93 2 . 12 1 . 21
Total Aid (% of public investment) 0.0 6.2 5.2 4.4 4.2 3.5 2.8 1.8 0.6
Total debt (% of GDP) 0.0 0.0 -0.2 -0.3 -0.5 -0.7 -0.9 -1.1 -1.2
Educated labor (in % of population) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.002 0.004 0.006 0.010 0.014
Years
Table 3
Haiti : Higher Total Public Investment and Higher Efficiency of Public Investment, 2007-15






  502007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Real GDP per capita at market prices (% change) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
Poverty rate-Ravallion's adjusted elasticity (Gini = 66.0) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.1
Poverty rate-Growth elasticity of -1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 -0.2
Government Sector (% of GDP)
Total resources (including grants) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
  Total revenues 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
       Direct taxes 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
       Indirect taxes 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
       User fees 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
   Foreign aid (grants) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Total expenditure 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
    Spending on goods and services (total) 0.0 -0.5 -0.5 -0.5 -0.5 -0.5 -0.5 -0.5 -0.5
       Spending on maintenance 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
       Wages and salaries 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
       Security 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
      Other 0.0 -0.5 -0.5 -0.5 -0.5 -0.5 -0.5 -0.5 -0.5
   Investment 0.0 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
   Interest payments 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Overall fiscal balance including grants (cash basis) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Memorandum items
Private investment (% of GDP) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3
Public investment (% of total public expenditure) 0.0 3.4 3.4 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3
   Health (% of public investment) 0.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0
   Infrastructure (% of public investment) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
   Education (% of public investment) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
   Other (% of public investment) 0.0 -5.0 -5.0 -5.0 -5.0 -5.0 -5.0 -5.0 -5.0
Aid (% of total revenue) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
Total Aid (% of public investment) 0.0 -8.0 -7.6 -7.2 -7.2 -7.2 -7.2 -7.2 -7.2
Total debt (% of GDP) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1
Educated labor (in % of population) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Years
Table 4
Haiti : Reallocation of spending to health , 2007-15
(Deviation from the Baseline scenario)
  
 
  512007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Real GDP per capita at market prices (% change) 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.1
Poverty rate-Ravallion's adjusted elasticity (Gini = 66.0) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2
Poverty rate-Growth elasticity of -1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6
Government Sector (% of GDP)
Total resources (including grants) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1
  Total revenues 0.0 1.2 2.2 3.2 3.2 3.2 3.2 3.2 3.2
       Direct taxes 0.0 1.1 2.1 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0
       Indirect taxes 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
       User fees 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
   F o r e i g n  a i d  ( g r a n t s ) 0 . 0- 1 . 2- 2 . 2- 3 . 1- 3 . 1- 3 . 1- 3 . 1- 3 . 1-
Total expenditure 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1
    Spending on goods and services (total) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
       Spending on maintenance 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
       Wages and salaries 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
       Security 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
      Other 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
   Investment 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
   Interest payments 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Overall fiscal balance including grants (cash basis) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Memorandum items
P r i v a t e  i n v e s t m e n t  ( %  o f  G D P ) 0 . 0- 1 . 0- 2 . 2- 3 . 3- 3 . 5- 3 . 7- 3 . 8- 3 . 9-
Public investment (% of total public expenditure) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1
   Health (% of public investment) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
   Infrastructure (% of public investment) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
   Education (% of public investment) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
   Other (% of public investment) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Aid (% of total revenue) 0.0 -16.2 -28.0 -38.7 -38.9 -39.0 -38.9 -38.8 -38.6
Total Aid (% of public investment) 0.0 -24.2 -40.6 -54.7 -54.7 -54.7 -54.8 -54.7 -54.7
Total debt (% of GDP) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3
Educated labor (in % of population) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Years
Table 5
Haiti : Lower collection cost, higher direct tax rate, 2007-15





  522007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Real GDP per capita at market prices (% change) 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.5 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.8
Poverty rate-Ravallion's adjusted elasticity (Gini = 66.0) 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.3 -0.4 -0.6 -0.8 -0.9
Poverty rate-Growth elasticity of -1.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.4 -0.8 -1.2 -1.6 -2.0 -2.4
Government Sector (% of GDP)
Total resources (including grants) 0.0 1.2 2.1 3.1 3.1 3.1 3.0 3.0 3.0
  Total revenues 0.0 1.2 2.2 3.1 3.1 3.1 3.0 3.0 3.0
       Direct taxes 0.0 1.1 2.1 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0
       Indirect taxes 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
       User fees 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2
   Foreign aid (grants) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Total expenditure 0.0 1.2 2.1 3.1 3.1 3.1 3.0 3.0 3.0
    Spending on goods and services (total) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1
       Spending on maintenance 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1
       Wages and salaries 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2
       Security 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
      Other 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
   Investment 0.0 1.2 2.2 3.1 3.1 3.1 3.0 3.0 3.0
   Interest payments 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Overall fiscal balance including grants (cash basis) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Memorandum items
Private investment (% of GDP) 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.6 1.2 1.8 2.4 3.0 3.7
Public investment (% of total public expenditure) 0.0 5.0 8.1 10.7 10.7 10.8 10.8 10.9 10.9
   Health (% of public investment) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
   Infrastructure (% of public investment) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
   Education (% of public investment) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
   Other (% of public investment) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Aid (% of total revenue) 0.0 -5.1 -9.3 -13.7 -13.8 -13.9 -14.1 -14.1 -14.2
Total Aid (% of public investment) 0.0 -17.1 -25.8 -32.0 -32.2 -32.4 -32.6 -32.8 -33.0
Total debt (% of GDP) 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.2 -0.4 -0.6 -0.8 -1.0 -1.2
Educated labor (in % of population) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Years
Table 6
Haiti : Lower collection cost, higher direct tax rate, new revenue to investment in infrastructure, 2007-15
(Deviation from the Baseline scenario)
  
 
  532007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Real GDP per capita at market prices (% change) 0.000 -0.001 0.000 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.003
Poverty rate-Ravallion's adjusted elasticity (Gini = 66.0) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.003
Poverty rate-Growth elasticity of -1.0 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.002 -0.004 -0.005 -0.007
Government Sector (% of GDP)
Total resources (including grants) 0.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 2.5 2.0 1.5 1.5
  Total revenues 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
       Direct taxes 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
       Indirect taxes 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
       User fees 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
   Foreign aid (grants) 0.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 2.5 2.0 1.5 1.5
Total expenditure 0.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 2.5 2.0 1.5 1.5
    Spending on goods and services (total) 0.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 2.5 2.0 1.5 1.5
       Spending on maintenance 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
       Wages and salaries 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
       Security 0.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 2.5 2.0 1.5 1.5
      Other 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
   Investment 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
   Interest payments 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Overall fiscal balance including grants (cash basis) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Memorandum items
Private investment (% of GDP) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
Public investment (% of total public expenditure) 0.0 -5.8 -6.0 -6.1 -6.2 -5.3 -4.3 -3.3 -3.3
   Health (% of public investment) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
   Infrastructure (% of public investment) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
   Education (% of public investment) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
   Other (% of public investment) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Aid (% of total revenue) 0.0 31.4 31.6 31.8 31.9 26.6 21.3 15.9 15.9
Total Aid (% of public investment) 0.0 60.7 56.1 52.2 52.2 43.6 34.9 26.2 26.2
Total debt (% of GDP) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Educated labor (in % of population) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Years
Table 7
Haiti : Higher security spending, 2007-15
(Deviation from the Baseline scenario)
 
 
  542007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Real GDP per capita at market prices (% change) 0.000 -0.013 0.003 0.016 0.026 0.037 0.046 0.054 0.059
Poverty rate-Ravallion's adjusted elasticity (Gini = 66.0) 0.000 0.003 0.002 -0.001 -0.006 -0.014 -0.023 -0.034 -0.046
Poverty rate-Growth elasticity of -1.0 0.000 0.007 0.006 -0.003 -0.017 -0.037 -0.061 -0.090 -0.121
Government Sector (% of GDP)
Total resources (including grants) 0.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 2.5 2.0 1.5 1.5
  Total revenues 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1
       Direct taxes 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
       Indirect taxes 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1
       User fees 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
   Foreign aid (grants) 0.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 2.5 2.1 1.6 1.6
Total expenditure 0.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 2.5 2.0 1.5 1.5
    Spending on goods and services (total) 0.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 2.5 2.0 1.5 1.5
       Spending on maintenance 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
       Wages and salaries 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
       Security 0.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 2.5 2.0 1.5 1.5
      Other 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
   Investment 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
   Interest payments 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Overall fiscal balance including grants (cash basis) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Memorandum items
Private investment (% of GDP) 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 1.2 1.4 1.5
Public investment (% of total public expenditure) 0.0 -5.8 -6.0 -6.1 -6.1 -5.2 -4.3 -3.3 -3.2
   Health (% of public investment) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
   Infrastructure (% of public investment) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
   Education (% of public investment) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
   Other (% of public investment) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Aid (% of total revenue) 0.0 31.2 31.5 31.7 31.8 26.7 21.5 16.4 16.3
Total Aid (% of public investment) 0.0 60.9 56.5 52.7 52.9 44.4 35.8 27.2 27.2
Total debt (% of GDP) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1
Educated labor (in % of population) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.1
Years
Table 8
Haiti : Higher security spending and Elasticity of Security Spending, 2007-15
(Deviation from the Baseline scenario)
 
  552007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Real GDP per capita at market prices (% change) 0.0 0.1 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.5
Poverty rate-Ravallion's adjusted elasticity (Gini = 66.0) 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.2 -0.4 -0.5 -0.6 -0.7 -0.8
Poverty rate-Growth elasticity of -1.0 0.0 0.0 -0.3 -0.6 -0.9 -1.3 -1.6 -1.9 -2.2
Government Sector (% of GDP)
Total resources (including grants) 0.0 8.0 8.0 8.0 8.0 6.5 5.0 3.5 2.5
  Total revenues 0.0 1.5 2.4 3.4 3.4 3.4 3.4 3.4 3.4
       Direct taxes 0.0 1.1 2.1 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0
       Indirect taxes 0.0 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1
       User fees 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2
   Foreign aid (grants) 0.0 6.5 5.6 4.6 4.6 3.1 1.6 0.1 -0.9
Total expenditure 0.0 8.0 8.0 8.0 8.0 6.5 5.0 3.5 2.5
    Spending on goods and services (total) 0.0 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.0 1.5 1.0 1.0
       Spending on maintenance 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
       Wages and salaries 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1
       Security 0.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 2.5 2.0 1.5 1.5
      Other 0.0 -0.5 -0.5 -0.5 -0.5 -0.5 -0.5 -0.5 -0.5
   Investment 0.0 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.5 4.5 3.5 2.5 1.5
   Interest payments 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Overall fiscal balance including grants (cash basis) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Memorandum items
Private investment (% of GDP) 0.0 -1.2 -1.8 -2.4 -1.9 -1.3 -0.7 -0.2 0.2
Public investment (% of total public expenditure) 0.0 12.3 11.5 10.8 10.8 9.5 8.1 6.4 3.3
   Health (% of public investment) 0.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0
   Infrastructure (% of public investment) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
   Education (% of public investment) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
   Other (% of public investment) 0.0 -5.0 -5.0 -5.0 -5.0 -5.0 -5.0 -5.0 -5.0
Aid (% of total revenue) 0.0 53.5 36.9 21.6 21.6 9.8 -2.0 -13.7 -21.5
Total Aid (% of public investment) 0.0 16.5 6.2 -3.2 -3.4 -9.6 -17.1 -26.4 -31.4
Total debt (% of GDP) 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.3 -0.5 -0.6 -0.8 -0.9 -1.1
Educated labor (in % of population) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.004 0.008 0.012 0.016 0.020
Years
Table 9
Haiti : Combined shock with lower collection cost, higher direct tax and security spending, 2007-15 
(Deviation from the Baseline scenario)
 
 
  562007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Real GDP per capita at market prices (% change) 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.6
Poverty rate-Ravallion's adjusted elasticity (Gini = 66.0) 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.2 -0.4 -0.5 -0.6 -0.8 -0.9
Poverty rate-Growth elasticity of -1.0 0.0 0.0 -0.3 -0.6 -0.9 -1.3 -1.7 -2.0 -2.3
Government Sector (% of GDP)
Total resources (including grants) 0.0 8.0 8.0 8.0 8.0 6.5 5.0 3.4 2.4
  Total revenues 0.0 1.4 2.4 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3
       Direct taxes 0.0 1.1 2.1 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0
       Indirect taxes 0.0 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.0
       User fees 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2
   Foreign aid (grants) 0.0 6.5 5.6 4.6 4.6 3.1 1.6 0.1 -0.9
Total expenditure 0.0 8.0 8.0 8.0 8.0 6.5 5.0 3.4 2.4
    Spending on goods and services (total) 0.0 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.0 1.5 1.0 1.0
       Spending on maintenance 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
       Wages and salaries 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2
       Security 0.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 2.5 2.0 1.5 1.5
      Other 0.0 -0.5 -0.5 -0.5 -0.5 -0.5 -0.5 -0.5 -0.5
   Investment 0.0 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.5 4.5 3.5 2.5 1.5
   Interest payments 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Overall fiscal balance including grants (cash basis) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Memorandum items
Private investment (% of GDP) 0.0 -1.1 -1.5 -1.8 -1.0 -0.2 0.5 1.3 1.9
Public investment (% of total public expenditure) 0.0 12.3 11.5 10.8 10.8 9.5 8.1 6.4 3.3
   Health (% of public investment) 0.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0
   Infrastructure (% of public investment) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
   Education (% of public investment) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
   Other (% of public investment) 0.0 -5.0 -5.0 -5.0 -5.0 -5.0 -5.0 -5.0 -5.0
Aid (% of total revenue) 0.0 53.2 37.0 22.3 22.5 11.1 -0.3 -11.5 -18.8
Total Aid (% of public investment) 0.0 17.7 7.7 -1.6 -1.4 -7.5 -14.9 -24.3 -29.5
Total debt (% of GDP) 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.3 -0.5 -0.7 -0.8 -1.0 -1.1
Educated labor (in % of population) 0.000 0.000 -0.003 -0.007 -0.012 -0.020 -0.029 -0.040 -0.053
Years
Table 10
Haiti : Combined shock with higher security expenditure, direct taxes, and elasticity of security expenditure, 2007-15
(Deviation from the Baseline scenario)
 
  572007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Real GDP per capita at market prices (% change) 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.5
Poverty rate-Ravallion's adjusted elasticity (Gini = 66.0) 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.3 -0.4 -0.6 -0.7 -0.9 -1.0
Poverty rate-Growth elasticity of -1.0 0.0 0.0 -0.3 -0.7 -1.2 -1.6 -1.9 -2.3 -2.5
Government Sector (% of GDP)
Total resources (including grants) 0.0 8.0 8.0 8.0 7.9 6.4 4.9 3.4 2.4
  Total revenues 0.0 0.5 0.4 0.9 1.4 1.9 2.3 2.4 2.4
       Direct taxes 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.6 1.1 1.6 2.1 2.1 2.1
       Indirect taxes 0.0 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1
       User fees 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2
   Foreign aid (grants) 0.0 7.5 7.5 7.1 6.6 4.6 2.6 1.1 0.1
Total expenditure 0.0 8.0 8.0 8.0 7.9 6.4 4.9 3.4 2.4
    Spending on goods and services (total) 0.0 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.0 1.5 1.0 0.9
       Spending on maintenance 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
       Wages and salaries 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 -0.2
       Security 0.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 2.5 2.0 1.5 1.5
      Other 0.0 -0.5 -0.5 -0.5 -0.5 -0.5 -0.5 -0.5 -0.5
   Investment 0.0 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.5 4.5 3.5 2.5 1.5
   Interest payments 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Overall fiscal balance including grants (cash basis) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Memorandum items
Private investment (% of GDP) 0.0 -0.2 0.3 0.5 0.6 0.8 0.8 1.3 1.7
Public investment (% of total public expenditure) 0.0 12.3 11.5 10.8 10.8 9.6 8.1 6.5 3.3
   Health (% of public investment) 0.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0
   Infrastructure (% of public investment) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
   Education (% of public investment) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
   Other (% of public investment) 0.0 -5.0 -5.0 -5.0 -5.0 -5.0 -5.0 -5.0 -5.0
Aid (% of total revenue) 0.0 72.7 73.5 63.2 53.6 31.4 10.9 -1.9 -10.5
Total Aid (% of public investment) 0.0 25.8 24.1 18.4 13.9 4.7 -6.5 -14.6 -18.0
Total debt (% of GDP) 0.0 0.0 -0.2 -0.4 -0.6 -0.8 -1.0 -1.1 -1.2
Educated labor (in % of population) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.003 0.005 0.009 0.013
Years
Table 11
Haiti : Combined shock with lower collection cost, higher security spending, and direct tax incresing later, 2007-15 
(Deviation from the Baseline scenario)
 
  582007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Real GDP per capita at market prices (% change) 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.6
Poverty rate-Ravallion's adjusted elasticity (Gini = 66.0) 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.3 -0.4 -0.6 -0.8 -0.9 -1.0
Poverty rate-Growth elasticity of -1.0 0.0 0.0 -0.3 -0.7 -1.2 -1.6 -2.0 -2.4 -2.7
Government Sector (% of GDP)
Total resources (including grants) 0.0 8.0 8.0 8.0 7.9 6.4 4.9 3.4 2.4
  Total revenues 0.0 0.5 0.4 0.9 1.4 1.8 2.3 2.3 2.3
       Direct taxes 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.6 1.1 1.6 2.1 2.1 2.1
       Indirect taxes 0.0 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0
       User fees 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2
   Foreign aid (grants) 0.0 7.5 7.5 7.1 6.6 4.6 2.6 1.1 0.1
Total expenditure 0.0 8.0 8.0 8.0 7.9 6.4 4.9 3.4 2.4
    Spending on goods and services (total) 0.0 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.0 1.4 0.9 0.9
       Spending on maintenance 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
       Wages and salaries 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 -0.2
       Security 0.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 2.5 2.0 1.5 1.5
      Other 0.0 -0.5 -0.5 -0.5 -0.5 -0.5 -0.5 -0.5 -0.5
   Investment 0.0 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.5 4.5 3.5 2.5 1.5
   Interest payments 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Overall fiscal balance including grants (cash basis) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Memorandum items
Private investment (% of GDP) 0.0 0.0 0.7 1.1 1.5 1.8 2.1 2.8 3.5
Public investment (% of total public expenditure) 0.0 12.3 11.6 10.8 10.8 9.6 8.2 6.5 3.4
   Health (% of public investment) 0.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0
   Infrastructure (% of public investment) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
   Education (% of public investment) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
   Other (% of public investment) 0.0 -5.0 -5.0 -5.0 -5.0 -5.0 -5.0 -5.0 -5.0
Aid (% of total revenue) 0.0 72.1 72.7 62.7 53.5 31.9 12.1 -0.3 -8.4
Total Aid (% of public investment) 0.0 27.0 25.6 20.1 15.9 6.8 -4.3 -12.5 -16.1
Total debt (% of GDP) 0.0 0.0 -0.2 -0.4 -0.6 -0.8 -1.0 -1.2 -1.3
Educated labor (in % of population) 0.000 0.000 -0.003 -0.008 -0.016 -0.025 -0.035 -0.047 -0.059
Years
Table 12
Haiti : Combined shock with lower collection cost, higher security spending, elasticity of security spending, and direct tax incresing later, 2007-15
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  60Figure 2 
Haiti : Higher Total Public Investment,  2007-15
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  61Figure 3 
Haiti : Higher Total Public Investment and Higher Efficiency 
of Public Investment, 2007-15
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  62Figure 4 
Haiti : Reallocation of spending to health , 2007-15
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  63Figure 5 
Haiti : Lower collection cost, higher direct tax rate, 2007-15
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  64Figure 6 
Haiti : Lower collection cost, higher direct tax rate, new 
revenue to investment in infrastructure, 2007-15
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  65Figure 7 
Haiti : Higher security spending, 2007-15
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  66Figure 8 
Haiti : Higher security spending and Elasticity of Security 
Spending, 2007-15
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  67Figure 9 
Haiti : Combined shock with lower collection cost, higher 
direct tax and security spending, 2007-15 
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  68Figure 10 
Haiti : Combined shock with higher security expenditure, 
direct taxes, and elasticity of security expenditure, 2007-15 
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  69Figure 11 
Haiti : Combined shock with lower collection cost, higher 
security spending, and direct tax incresing later, 2007-15 
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  70Figure 12 
Haiti : Combined shock with lower collection cost, higher 
security spending, elasticity of security spending, and direct 
tax incresing later, 2007-15 
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